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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(3)0). Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(4), the
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based upon City
Market's lack of duty under the applicable Utah law for allegedly hazardous conditions
existing upon property it neither owned nor possessed?
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment because there were
disputed material facts?
Appellee disputes Appellant's statement of issues on appeal in that the issue of
reversing burden of proof was never raised at the trial court level and was presented for the
first time on appeal.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
"Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). The Appellate Court will "review summary judgment decisions for correction of
error." Tallmanv. The City of Hurricane. 1999 UT 55; 985 P.2d 892, P5. "Furthermore,
because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is
properly done by juries rather than judges, 'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence
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cases only in the clearest instances.'" Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah
1996). However, "without a duty, there can be no negligence as a matter of law, and
summary judgment is appropriate". Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corp.. 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
City Market asserts that plaintiff failed to preserve for appeal either her objections
to the reference to the lease during oral arguments on City Market's motion for summary
judgment or her assertion that the trial court reversed the burden of proof with respect to
raising disputed issues of fact as part of a summary judgment motion. City Market has filed
no cross appeals.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Price City Ordinance 6-1; Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
City Market is not dissatisfied with paragraph 1 of plaintiff s statement of the case.
However, City Market is dissatisfied with the statement of the case found in paragraph 2 of
plaintiffs brief. Plaintiff made no allegations in her complaint that defendant leased the
area where the accident in question occurred. Plaintiff raised this assertion without
supporting facts in her memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
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judgment (Record on Appeal, pg. 171, para. 1.) The actual contents of the lease were
discussed, without objection from plaintiff at oral argument. (Record on Appeal, pg. 234.)
Similarly, City Market is dissatisfied with paragraph 3 of plaintiff s statement of the
case. Specifically, those portions which make reference to alleged facts without any
reference to the record on appeal. Specifically, City Market objects to the references to
those portions of the Price City records and the affidavit of Molly Penovich, attached as
part of Addendum E to Appellant's Brief which plaintiff asserts contain representations that
City Market had actual control over the exact area where the dangerous conditions existed.
The site diagram contained in plaintiffs Addendum E page 4 purports to show that the
accident occurred in the fire lane rather than any parking stalls designated for City Market's
use. Further, the information in the affidavit and statutes contain no evidence to support
plaintiffs representations in paragraph 3 of her statement of the case.
City Market is not dissatisfied with the remaining paragraph under plaintiffs
statement concerning the nature of the case and course of the proceedings. Similarly, City
Market is not dissatisfied with plaintiffs description of the disposition in the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee's Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts.
1. City Market is not dissatisfied with this statement of fact.
2. Plaintiff, through counsel, raised no objection at oral argument to defendant's
references to the lease. Plaintiff made no objections to references to the lease without
-3-

introducing it into evidence. This argument was not raised at the trial court level. The lease
contents were not at issue until plaintiff introduced the Price City ordinances. Those
ordinances and the accompanying affidavit submitted by plaintiff do not establish an issue
of material fact supporting any allegations that City Market was the owner or possessor of
the area where the plaintiff claims to have fallen. (See Record on Appeal, pg. 234 and
Affidavit of Molly Penovich, Appellant's Addendum E.)
3. City Market is dissatisfied with plaintiffs statement of facts 3. Price City
Ordinance 6-1 required that "at the time a building is erected or enlarged or increased in
capacity, or any use is established, there shall be provided off-street parking spaces for
automobiles in accordance with the following requirements...." Neither the ordinance nor
the affidavit contains any assertion that City Market designated itself as the tenant of the
parking lot and fire lane adjacent to its store. Neither the affidavit nor the ordinance cited
to either a fire lane or common areas. The plaintiffs statement of fact is simply wrong
when it asserts that either the Price ordinances or the affidavit supports the factual
assertion that City Market "represented to Price City that the parking area and fire lane are
part of its designated common area...."
4. To the extent that plaintiff appears to be asserting that the allegations in her
complaint are facts that are supported by the record on appeal, City Market is dissatisfied
with this purported statement of fact. Plaintiff, in responding to motions for summary
judgment is not entitled to simply rest on the allegations contained in her complaint.
-4-

5. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of fact in that it contains no
reference to the record on appeal.
6. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that plaintiff
attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record on
appeal.
7. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that plaintiff
attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record on
appeal.
8. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that plaintiff
attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record on
appeal.
9. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that plaintiff
attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record on
appeal.
10. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that
plaintiff attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record
on appeal.
11. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of facts to the extent that
plaintiff attempts to assert an allegation of her complaint as a fact supported by the record
on appeal.
-5-

12. City Market is dissatisfied with this statement of fact. Plaintiff has improperly
attempted to include in the record portions of the transcript of the deposition of Patty
Hevelone. There were no references in oral argument to City Market's motion summary
judgment motion to any testimony or to any issues raised during plaintiffs deposition.
There is nothing in the transcript of the oral argument to support plaintiffs allegation that
she raised those issues during oral arguments. (Record on Appeal, pp. 230-265.) Further,
plaintiff has filed no motions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
supplement the record on appeal with her deposition transcript.
Appellee's Statement of Facts.
1. In paragraph 11 of plaintiff s complaint, she asserted that defendant City Market
owed a duty to its business invitees while traveling "back and forth across the paved parking
area immediately adjacent to their store front...." Further, this paragraph asserts that City
Market was negligent in failing to warn its business invitees or take steps necessary to
protect its business invitees from such hazard. (Record on Appeal, pg. 003, 004.)
2. In paragraph 13 of plaintiff s complaint, she alleged "that the defendants, and each
of them owed a duty to the plaintiff with the respect to the maintenance of the property
upon which the City Market store was located and that they were negligent in performance
of said duty and that their negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff on January 27, 1998". (Record on Appeal, pg. 004.)

-6-

3. Further plaintiff alleged in paragraph 17 that "the defendants, and each of them,
knew or should have known as it was reasonably foreseeable that in (sic) business invitees
to the City Market store could be injured in the event that they stepped into the open
manhole area in the asphalt." (Record on Appeal, pg. 005.)
4. With the exception of paragraph 2 in plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to
City Market's motion for summary judgment, no alleged statement of fact was supported by
any reference to the record or to any affidavit. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 171-174.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of City Market.
Plaintiffs argument that City Market, because of its knowledge of the purported
construction activities occurring outside of its facility, owed a duty to the plaintiff
irrespective of its lack of ownership or possession or occupancy of the area in question is
contradicted by applicable Utah law.
In order to create a duty to protect the plaintiff from the actions of third parties, a
special relationship must exist between the parties. No such relationship extending outside
the City Market premises was established by plaintiff. Utah law is clear that the duties
imposed upon businesses is restricted to those locations where it occupies the property in
question. Therefore, the trial court's granting of summary judgment was appropriate.
Plaintiff failed to object to the references to the lease during oral argument. As
such, she waived any objections to the trial court's consideration of those provisions. Her
-7-

efforts to overturn the trial court's decision based upon those references to the lease are
arguments raised for the first time on appeal and as such, should not be considered by the
court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE
REFERENCES TO THE LEASE ARE ISSUES
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
Utah law is clear that the Appellate Court's will not consider arguments raised for
the first time on appeal. In Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Center, 2003 UT 23, P44;
70 P.3d 904, the Utah Supreme Court held:
Because we do not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal, see Treff v. Hinckley. 2001 UT 50, P9 n. 4, 26 P.3d
212, summary judgment cannot rest on this argument.
A review of the transcript on appeal indicates that the contents of the lease
agreement were discussed without objection from plaintiffs counsel. The specific
provisions of the lease relating to the common use of the adjacent parking area was found
on page 5 of the transcript. (Record on Appeal, pg. 234.) At the time the lease was cited to
the court, plaintiffs counsel made no objections. Later, when plaintiffs counsel was given
an opportunity to respond, no objections were raised. (See page 10 of the transcript,
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Record on Appeal, pg. 239.) Plaintiffs failure to object prevented the parties from
remedying this alleged error at the hearing.
The rationale for such a holding is expressed in well-established Utah law. In Huber.
et al. v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah 1944), the Supreme Court explained its
reluctance to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. The court held:
It is elementary that when a party does not raise objections
below when he had notice and opportunity to object, he may not
be heard to complain for the first time on appeal. We hold,
therefore, that defendant waived all of these defects, if any
there were, by failing to object below and we shall not further
consider them.
145P.2dat783.
POINT II.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN
DETERMINING THAT CITY MARKET
OWED NO DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF.
A.

Utah's Premises Liability Law Does Not Impose a Duty on City Market
to Protect Against Hazardous Conditions Occurring Off Its Premises.

Utah law is based upon the classifications contained in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in evaluating premises liability. While dictum in earlier cases may have suggested
otherwise, the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed that Utah follows the traditional
classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser when dealing with premises liability. In
Kessler v. Mortensen. 2000 UT 95; 16 P.3d 1225, the court addressed the application of
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the attractive nuisance doctrine to a minor trespasser. In its analysis, the court abandoned
its prior rulings in reference to attractive nuisance and adopted the analysis formed in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 339. In doing so, the court also ruled:
P16 Finally, we are urged by the plaintiff to abolish the
traditional classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser.
We are not now persuaded to do so and decline to abandon the
traditional land entrant classifications.
The thrust of plaintiff s argument is found in her reply memorandum to City
Market's motion for summary judgment. In her brief, she asserted that knowledge on the
part of City Market of the potential hazard and the foresee ability that customers ultimately
coming to City Market might have to negotiate that hazard was enough to impose a duty
upon City Market to remedy the situation. She stated:
In short, ownership of the area is immaterial. Even occupancy
and tenancy is really immaterial. All that is material under
Carlile. supra, is that City Market knew or should have known
that its business invitees might use the parking area and be
forced to travel across the obviously hazardous condition
which existed as the (sic) approached main entrance.
Record on Appeal, pg. 177.
Plaintiff argued that under the case of Carlile v. Wal-Mart. 2000 UT App. 412; 61
P.3d 287, the Utah Court of Appeals extended the duty of a business to its invitees beyond
the business's property line. Such an expanse of reading of Carlile is supported by neither
the facts of the case nor the actual holding of the Court of Appeals.
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The facts of Carlile are quite simple. The plaintiff, Nannette Carlile, appealed from
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. While examining the
merits of the summary judgment, the court of appeals observed that" Carlile was in the
fabrics section of Wal-Mart when she was struck by an electric cart. The woman driving
the cart fled the scene and has not been identified." Carlile at P2. The court eventually
reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to perform discovery to
determine whether or not Wal-Mart had been given adequate warning of the reckless
manner in which the customer was driving the electric cart in question. The court also
permitted the plaintiff to perform discovery to determine whether "the use of an electric
cart in a store may present a foreseeable danger of an accident, absent proper safety
precautions." JdL at PI6. (Emphasis added.)
In performing its evaluation, the Carlile court used as its guide Utah premises
liability law. Every case cited in the Carlile decision involved an accident that occurred on
4he premises of the business at issue. For example, in Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets.
918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the fall in question occurred when the plaintiff entered the deli
section of the Storehouse Market and slipped upon a scoop of ice cream that another
customer had dropped. Id at 477. Similarly, in Pagan v. Thrift City, Inc.. 23 Utah 2d 207,
209; 460 P.2d 832, 834 (1969), the accident in question occurred in the parking lot owned
by Thrift City. That decision cited specifically:
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A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for
business purposes is subject to liability for injuries to
members of the public where harm is caused by negligent or
intentional acts of third persons provided the possessor of the
land failed to exercise reasonable care to discover that such
acts are being done or are likely to be done, or to give a
warning adequate to enable visitors to avoid harm.
Id at 834.
In Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991), the court stated:
Dwiggins was shopping in the Morgan Jewelers' store
located at a strip mall at 2774 West 3500 South in West Valley
City when it was robbed on December 10, 1986. During the
course of the robbery, one of the robbers struck Dwiggins on
the head with a crowbar.
Id at 182,
In each of these cases, the actionable claims occurred upon the premises of the
property owner. Finally, in English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993), the court
examined a grant of summary judgment in favor of a landlord for injuries sustained when
his tenant was injured performing repairs on the property. As part of its analysis, the court
examined Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 343, and affirmed the obligations there
of a possessor of land towards invitees caused "by a condition on the land". The court then
observed:
For the purposes of our analysis here, we will assume that
Kienke [landlord] was a "possessor" of land, although under
section 328E of the Restatement, a possessor is one in actual
physical possession. See id^§ 328E. Kienke did not live on
-12-

the property; it was a vacant rental unit in need of repairs and
renovation. Kienke visited the premises only occasionally.
Kienke at 156.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 328E sited with approval in Kienke states as
follows:
328E Possessor of Land Defined.
A possessor of land is
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it....
Comment a states:
"Possession" has been given various meanings in the law, and
the term frequently is used to denote the legal relationship
resulting from facts rather than in the sense of describing the
facts themselves. It is used here strictly in the factual sense,
because it has been so used in almost all tort cases.
The important thing in the law of torts is the possession,
and not whether it is or is not rightful as between the possessor
and some third person.
It is also of critical importance to recognize that the status of the plaintiff as an
invitee only attaches when she is on land of another. Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Section 332 defines an invitee as
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter a
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public. (Emphasis added.)
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Similarly, Comment a further confirms the temporary status of an invitee when it
states in part:
Invitees are limited to those persons who enter or remain on
land upon an invitation which carries with it an implied
representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable
care has been used to prepare the premises and make them safe
for their reception. (Emphasis added.)
With this underlying analysis of a business owner's liability, the Carlile decision
follows the precedent. All of the actions upon which the court relied in reversing the trial
court occurred on the premises of Wal-Mart. Ms. Hevelone, in her brief, asserts that the
trial court's ruling was based on a false presumption that the hazardous condition must exist
on the leased premises for any liability to attach. In support of her position, she cites
Carlile and its reference to Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). That
analysis is simply wrong. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed Dwiggins in Steffensen
v. Smith's Manaeement Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Utah 1993). In that matter, the court
stated:
In Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, (cite omitted), we stated that
a possessor of land must exercise due care and prudence for
the safety of business invitees. (Emphasis added.)
It strains credibility to suggest that a possessor of land who has a duty to those who
obtain the statutes of an invitee while on their premises continues with that duty beyond its
premises. Utah law is clear that the possessor's duty is created when the invitee acquires
that status by entering on to the business owner's land. If that were not the case, a shopper
-14-

at a mall who visited multiple stores would have a cause of action against every store owner
for any hazardous condition the shopper might encounter irrespective of where that
hazardous condition existed. Absent some bright line test, no logical stopping point for a
duty is imposed by simple foreseeability alone. A malfunctioning street light, an uneven
sidewalk, or a pot hole in the road at the entrance to a mall, would under plaintiffs theory,
impose liability on any store owner the shopper may choose to visit. Such liability is
unsupported by Utah law.
In Beach v. The University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), the court addressed a
similar legal theory under remarkably different factual circumstances. There, the plaintiff
sought to recover from the University of Utah for injuries she sustained when she was
injured as a consequence of her voluntary intoxication. In that matter the plaintiff asserted
that an affirmative duty existed on the part of the University of Utah through the professor
who supervised the field trip.
In its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court discussed in detail the essential requirement
in a negligence action of a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.
The court held,
Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for
another. ... The law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty
to act only when certain special relationships exist between the
parties. These relationships generally arise when one assumes
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or
her normal opportunities of self protection. Restatement
(Second) of Torts. § 314(A) (1964). The essence of a special
-15-

relationship is dependence by one party upon the other or
mutual dependence between the parties. Id at comment (b).
726 P.2d at 415-416.
In restricting the scope of duty to those facts, the court examined the consequence
of duty when it stated:
Determining whether one party has an affirmative duty to
protect another from the other's own acts, or those of a third
party requires careful consideration of the consequences for
the parties and society at large. If the duty is realistically
incapable of performance, or if it is fundamentally at odds with
the nature of the parties' relationship, we should be loathe to
term that relationship "special" and to impose a resulting
"duty" , for it is meaningless to speak of "special relationships"
and "duties" in the abstract. These terms are only labels which
the legal system applies to defined situations to indicate that
certain rights and obligations flow from them; they are an
"expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection". (Citations omitted.)
726P.2dat418.
As in Beach, an attempt to extend a possessor or land's duty to a business invitee off
those premises when the individual no longer is an invitee, is both realistically incapable of
being performed and is fundamentally at odds with the nature of these parties' relationship.
Plaintiff has acknowledged in her brief that she does not claim that City Market
created the hazardous condition. Therefore, her only claim is that City Market had a duty
running to the plaintiff to protect her from the acts of third parties. Utah law has indicated
that under two circumstances such a duty exists. The first is when a special relationship
-16-

exists as addressed in Beach. The second is when the plaintiff has been encouraged to enter
upon the possessor of land's premises as defined in Section 332 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.
These same underlying considerations provide protection to the possessor of land
from trespass by strangers. In Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996), the court
examined the standing of the plaintiff to pursue a claim for trespass. In affirming the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, the court stated:
Any claim based on trespass was properly dismissed because
the Stevensens did not have possession. To bring a claim
predicated on trespass, a plaintiff must have possession of the
land trespassed upon. "Trespass ... is a possessory action. In
order to maintain an action for trespass, 'the plaintiff must, at
the time of the trespass, have been in actual or constructive
possession of the land on which the acts of trespass were
committed.'" (Citations Omitted). The Stevensens did not have
possession of the Salt Lake Athletic Club during the
construction of the office building. Rather, the Stevensens had
only a security interest in the property. This is insufficient to
maintain a cause of action on the basis of trespass.
Id at 347.
IfjBgssession of land is a prerequisite, ta enable a party to t^^affiima^^^)ticms4o protect
#tself against trespass, that same prerequisite should apply before a party is subject to
liability to an invitee..
City Market has found no reported Utah cases where premises law obligations have
been imposed upon a party not in possession of the property at issue. The analytical
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approach to liability for a hazardous condition involves the determination of whether the
hazardous condition on the premises was created by the possessor or by a third party. That
same analysis was followed in Carlile, the only case relied upon by plaintiff to support her
expansive interpretation of Utah law.
B.

No Facts Were Presented to Establish that City Market Had Any
Possessory Interest in the Area Where the Accident Occurred,

Ms. Hevelone has repeatedly asserted that she presented evidence to establish that
City Market had an ownership interest in the area where the accident occurred. To support
her position, she has made reference to the facts contained in Addendum E, the affidavit of
Molly Penovich with its accompanying attachment. She has asserted that this established
some evidence that City Market had "a right to the use of a designated number of specific
parking stalls and a fire lane in the area that surrounded its store as designated in its site
plan. (Appellant Brief, pg. 15.) Examination of the affidavit of Molly Penovich does not
support such an assertion. Ms. Penovich did authenticate the site plan presented by City
Market in 1980. Similarly, it authenticated the Price City ordinance applying to off-street
parking. There is no reference in either the affidavit or the off-street parking ordinance that
makes any reference to sidewalks or common areas. Similarly, the ordinance does not
require a possessory interest in the parking stalls. Paragraph 6-1 Off-Street Parking
Required states:
At the time any building or any structure is erected or enlarged
or increased in capacity or any use is established, there shall be
-18-

provided off-street parking for automobiles in accordance with
the following requirements, or as otherwise required by
conditional use permit.
The handwritten notation on the site plan indicates clearly that the hazardous condition in
question occurred not in the parking stalls designated for City Market's use but in the fire
lane which under the site plan is noted to exclude parking.
It appears that plaintiff is asserting that because City Market had access to these
designated parking stalls, it was charged with knowledge that its potential customers,
through the use of those stalls, would be exposed to hazardous conditions not in the parking
area. Such knowledge, even if established, does not, under Utah law, impose upon City
Market a duty to protect the plaintiff from the hazardous conditions off its premises.
The assertion of such an expansive duty has the potential of clearly exceeding any
property owner's ability to meet that duty. Such a duty would require a party to protect its
potential customers from any hazard which their potential customers might encounter from
portal to portal. Every store owner that a prospective shopper might frequent would bear
the same burden. Clearly, Utah law only requires protection from the negligent acts of
third parties when a special relationship exists, not when a special relationship is merely
possible. Only after Ms. Hevelone entered City Market, was she an invitee. Only after she
entered City Market's premises did City Market owe her a duty to protect her from
hazardous conditions created by third parties.
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Plaintiffs efforts to generate facts unsupported by the record through reference in
the brief to the nature of the traffic patterns, the factual circumstances surrounding the
alleged construction project and the defect are all unsupported by reference to the record.
More importantly, these alleged facts were never asserted or argued during the motion for
summary judgment. These facts, even if considered by the court, do not change the
character and nature of City Market's duty towards the plaintiff. That duty, under Utah law,
does not extend to hazardous conditions created by third parties on property neither owned
nor possessed by City Market.
The trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. At
oral arguments, plaintiff, presented no procedural objections to the motion on the basis that
it was premature. Plaintiff made no motions to the court seeking to delay the hearing for
summary judgment on the basis that additional discovery was needed. Consequently, any
references in the brief by plaintiff to discovery conducted on the day of the deposition is
improper and should be stricken.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the trial court properly determine that the
plaintiffs claim against City Market was based upon a hazardous condition created by a
third party. There was no evidence presented to the trial court disputing that this hazardous
condition was not on property owned or possessed by City Market. As such, the other facts
relied upon by plaintiff, even if disputed, were not material to the critical determination of
-20-

the court. Summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate and should be affirmed by this
court.
DATED this "2-f day o F D w W , 2004.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant, City Market
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